scoutferro.blogg.se - Extrinsic vs intrinsic motivation

" Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries,"Įconomica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2016.

McConnell, 2012.ġ006, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.ġ21670, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.ġ7737, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Karlan, Dean & McConnell, Margaret A., 2012.ĩ6, Yale University, Department of Economics.

" Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving," National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, " Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," " Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment,"Ģ019/20, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.ģ580, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA). " Blood donations and incentives: evidence from a field experiment," " Blood donations and incentives : evidence from a field experiment,"Ģ008/05, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel. All of our findings can be explained by a model of tax compliance that unifies the standard Becker-Allingham-Sandmo approach (strengthening extrinsic motives for tax compliance) and the Andreoni (1989, 1990) warm-glow model of pro-social behaviour. Hence, whether recognition helps or hurts depends crucially on what motivates taxpayers in the first place, with positive effects on the intrinsically motivated and negative effects on the extrinsically motivated. Fourth and finally, recognition through social and monetary rewards for compliance has fundamentally different effects on baseline donors (who increase their payments) and baseline evaders (who reduce their payments). This is consistent with the fact that the enforcement constraint is not binding for the intrinsically motivated and therefore they are naturally unresponsive to deterrence.

Third, tax salience and deterrence have strong effects on compliance for baseline evaders, but small and insignificant effects for baseline donors. Second, announcing a zero audit probability (the status quo) has a small and insignificant effect on the compliance rate, showing that there is very little misperception on average. Intrinsic motivation is therefore substantial, although the majority behaves as rational, self-interested taxpayers. First, a significant fraction of agents (23%) comply in the zero deterrence baseline where compliance would be zero absent intrinsic motivation, while the remaining 77% evade the tax. Our main empirical findings are the following. This allows us to study if policies aimed at either extrinsic motivation (deterrence) or intrinsic motivation (recognition) have qualitatively different effects on agents who have revealed each of those motivations in the baseline. Starting from the zero deterrence baseline we use a randomized field experiment to inject deterrence or recognition into the system. Since there is zero deterrence in the baseline, baseline compliance provides a direct measure of intrinsically motivated tax compliance. As we show in the paper, tax evaders, compliers, and donors can coexist in the local church tax system and be precisely distinguished from each other. This study uses a unique setting for making progress on this question: the local church tax in Germany. The importance of such intrinsically motivated compliance is hard to study empirically and therefore the least understood. 1998), all of which are non-deterrence driven reasons for compliance.

Is tax compliance driven only by extrinsic motivations such as deterrence and tax policy or is there also a role for intrinsic motivations such as morals, norms and psychology? Agents may comply based on moral sentiments, social norms, guilt and shame (Andreoni et al.